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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2008, Buford “Keith” Simmons married Tracy 
Hoogenberg.1  One year later, the parties separated, and one 
month after that, Tracy filed a petition for dissolution of 
marriage.2  At the time of divorce, while Keith owned a wet-
suit business and maintained an ownership interest in a 
commercial building, Tracy held significant investment assets 
acquired from her first husband following his death.3  An 
“astoundingly lengthy, circuitous, and expensive course of 
litigation” followed.4  By the time the trial court resolved the 
case in July 2011, Tracy had already expended more than 
$800,000 in legal fees, due largely to Keith’s “questionable 
legal tactics,” which included his intentional failure to comply 
with the disclosure requirements.5  Specifically, Keith did not 
disclose the contents of his separate property savings account, 
valued at $254,850.24.  In its decision, among other sanctions 
applied against Keith,6 the trial court imposed the remedy for 
fraudulent failure to disclose property set forth in California 
Family Code Section 1101(h) and awarded Tracy the contents 
of Keith’s separate property savings account, valued at 
$254,850.24.7  Keith appealed, contending that California 
Family Code Section 1101(h) was inapplicable to his failure to 
disclose the separate property savings account.8 
The Court of Appeals identified the issue as follows: does 
California Family Code Section 1101(h) apply to the 
nondisclosure of separate property assets?9  After a careful 
consideration of the underlying law,10 the Simmons Court 
looked to statutory analysis11 and other authority,12 and 
 
 1. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 587 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 587–88. The Court’s analysis of these other sanctions is in an 
unpublished section of the opinion. 
 7. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 588 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 589. 
 10. Id. at 590–92. 
 11. Id. at 592–94. 
 12. Id. at 594. 
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agreed with Keith.13  In short, the Court of Appeals held that 
California Family Code Section 1101(h) should only apply to 
nondisclosures of community property.14 
I. ABOUT THIS COMMENT 
This Comment will explain how the Simmons Court 
erred in its decision.15  It will start by explaining the 
Simmons Court’s statement of the pertinent law16 and its 
subsequent analysis of this law.17  Then, this Comment will 
examine the Simmons opinion and critique its legal 
analysis.18  In conclusion, this Comment will offer a simple 
proposal that will eliminate the statutory interpretation issue 
currently faced by California courts.19 
A. The Simmons Court Presents the Law 
The California Court of Appeals in Simmons (the 
“Court”) began by noting that Section 721 of the California 
Family Code (the “CFC”)20 imposes a broad fiduciary 
relationship between spouses in their transactions with each 
other.21  Namely, Section 721 “imposes a duty of the highest 
good faith and fair dealing on each spouse,” requiring that 
“neither [spouse take] any unfair advantage of the other.”22  
The Court also noted that Section 721 “subjects the 
relationship to the same rights and duties applied to 
nonmarital partners under the Corporations Code.”23  
However, the Court did not discuss these Corporations Code 
sections in detail.24 
The Court then noted the importance of CFC Section 
 
 13. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 595 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part I.A.–I.K. 
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part I.C.–I.K. 
 19. See infra Conclusion. 
 20. California Family Code and “CFC” are used interchangeably throughout 
this Comment. 
 21. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  See also id. n.14 (citing the entirety of CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 
(2014)). CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 links to CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16403, 16404, and 
16503, which outline the “rights and duties” referenced in the body of the 
Court’s opinion. 
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1100’s specific placement in the Family Code.25  Notably, CFC 
1100 is located in a section entitled “Management and 
Control of Marital Property” and it delineates the rules 
governing “the management and control of community 
property.”26  In the same paragraph, the Court discussed that 
CFC 1100 obligates each spouse “to make full disclosure to 
the other spouse of all material facts and information 
regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all 
assets in which the community has or may have an 
interest . . . .”27 
CFC Section 1101 sets forth remedies for a breach of 
fiduciary duty between spouses.28  Under Section 1101(a), a 
spouse has a claim for any breach of the fiduciary duty that 
results in the impairment of the “undivided one-half interest 
in the community estate . . . .”29  Furthermore, Section 1101(f) 
allows a spouse to pursue the legal remedies in this section in 
either a legal dissolution action or independently, without 
filing a dissolution action.30  Section 1101(g) permits a court 
to award the plaintiff 50% of the value of the undisclosed 
asset, whereas subsection (h) permits a court to award 100% 
if the breach falls within California Civil Code Section 3294’s 
“oppression, fraud, or malice” standard.31  The Court also 
noted that this part of the Family Code includes sections 
which “set forth rules applicable to the management and 
control of community property when a spouse conveys or 
encumbers the community property (Section 1102) and when 
a spouse has a conservator or lacks legal capacity to manage 
the community property (Section 1103).”32 
In the final paragraph of the pertinent law, the Court 
discussed a spouse’s general obligation to disclose assets and 
liabilities in a marital dissolution.33  First, the Court noted 
CFC Section 2107, which imposes sanctions upon a party’s 
failure to comply with the duty of disclosure set forth in the 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 591 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 591–92 (4th Dist. 
2013). 
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chapter.34  Then, the Court pointed out CFC Section 2100, 
which requires a party to a dissolution proceeding to disclose 
all assets or liabilities in which one or both parties have or 
may have an interest) “regardless of the characterization [of 
the asset] as community or separate . . . .”35 
The Court then shifted its focus to CFC Section 271, 
contained in a part of the code entitled “Attorney’s Fees and 
Costs.”36 Notably, this section allows a court to award 
attorney fees and costs if a party’s conduct frustrates the 
policies of settlement, cost reduction, and cooperative 
resolution of litigation.37  The Court specifically highlighted 
California Family Code Section 271(c), which reads that an 
award of attorney’s fees and costs “is payable only from the 
property or income of the party against whom the sanction is 
imposed, except that the award may be against the 
sanctioned party’s share of the community property.”38 
B. The Simmons Court Analyzes the Law 
The Court examined Section 1101(h) once more and listed 
its goals during the process of statutory interpretation.39  
First, the Court quoted the statute in full:  
Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by one 
spouse, as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100, when the 
breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil 
Code shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the 
other spouse of 100[%], or an amount equal to 100[%], of 
any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the 
fiduciary duty.40   
Then, the Court noted that its goal when interpreting a 
statute was to ascertain the legislative intent of the statute so 
as to effectuate its intended purposes.41  Pursuant to this end, 
the Court gave the words “their ordinary and usual meaning” 
and construed them “in the context of the statute as a 
whole.”42 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 592. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Fong, 193 Cal. App. 4th 278, 288 (2d Dist. 
2011)). 
 42. Id. 
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The Court, left to resolve a case of first impression, then 
discussed that it was dealing with a statutory ambiguity.43  
First, the Court stated that facially, Section 1101(h) simply 
refers to the nondisclosure of “any asset.”44  That is, the Court 
elaborated that the statute does not specify whether its 
remedy is confined to nondisclosure of a community property 
asset or whether it also applies to nondisclosure of a separate 
property asset.45  Finally, the Court said that neither it nor 
the parties had found any case authority evaluating the issue 
of whether Section 1101(h) could be applied to separate 
property.46 
In the very next sentence of the opinion, the Court stated 
that the Legislature intended Section 1101(h) to provide a 
remedy only when a spouse fails to disclose community 
property.47  In support of this conclusion, it cited to the CFC 
generally and with regard to four specific statutory 
provisions.48  Next, it considered other authority, including 
case law and secondary legal commentary.49  Lastly, the 
Court considered a final counter argument before rendering 
its ultimate decision.50 
The first of the four statutory reasons cited by the Court 
dealt with Section 1101(h)’s specific location in the CFC.51  
Specifically, the Court argued that Section 1101(h) is set forth 
in a section of the Family Code that “exclusively concerns” 
matters associated with community property.52  For example, 
Section 1101(a)—located in the same section as 1101(h)—
allows a spouse to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim if the 
interest of this spouse in the community is impaired by the 
other spouse.53  The Court then admitted that, on its face, the 
statute’s use of “any asset” could encompass both separate 
and community property.54  Nevertheless, the Court read 
Section 1101(h) in conjunction with Section 1101(a), and said 
 
 43. Id. at 593. 
 44. Id. 
 45. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 46. Id. at 593. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 594. 
 50. Id. at 594–95. 
 51. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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that the latter’s usage of the terms “community interest” 
strongly suggested “any asset [from Section 1101(h)] means 
any community asset.”55 
The second reason cited by the Court shed light on how 
Section 1101(h) could be used outside of a dissolution action.56  
That is, Section 1101(f) says that the remedy provided in 
Section 1101(h) may be pursued in an action even when the 
parties have not filed for dissolution.57  To the Court, the 
availability of this remedy, even during a marriage, 
supported the conclusion that the remedy is not intended to 
extend to separate property, which “is generally not subject to 
the control of the non-owner spouse and which typically only 
becomes relevant upon the filing for dissolution.”58 
The Court’s third reason highlighted other existing 
statutory remedies for breaches of the duty to disclose 
separate property.59  Notably, the Legislature purposefully 
enacted remedies “that are expressly applicable to separate 
property, including Section 271 for uncooperative conduct in 
dissolution proceedings, and Section 2107 for nondisclosure of 
marital or separate property in dissolution proceedings.”60  
The existence of these distinct statutory remedies for 
nondisclosure of separate property assets, to the Court, 
supported the conclusion that a remedy located in a “section 
of the code devoted solely to community property was not 
designed to apply to separate property.”61 
The Court’s fourth and final argument based on statutory 
interpretation focused on the fundamental nature of 
community property.62  Citing CFC Section 2550, the Court 
said that a fundamental principle of family law, including 
during dissolution proceedings, is that each spouse has a one-
half interest in community property.63  This in mind, the 
Court then stated that Section 1101(a) provides that the 
fiduciary duty with respect to marital property is designed, 
among other things, to preserve that one-half interest.64  To 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 64. Id. 
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the Court, through the enactment of the Section 1101, the 
Legislature had in effect altered the one-half interest 
community property formula “in the event a spouse violates 
his or [sic] duty to preserve the other spouse’s one-half right 
to the property, by awarding the aggrieved spouse more than 
his or her one-half interest.”65 By its very nature, the one-half 
interest formula does not apply to separate property, as 
separate property is not subject to co-ownership-by or 
division-between the parties.66  Because of this lack of co-
ownership and division, the Court said, it followed that the 
Legislature’s alteration of the one-half interest formula was 
“not meant to be applied to nondisclosure of separate 
property.”67 
The Court then moved to relevant case law and cited four 
appellate court decisions whose interpretation of Section 1101 
was consistent with their own.68  The Court did not go into 
specific detail regarding these decisions, but rather listed 
them as follows: In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & 
Margulis,69 In re Marriage of Fossum,70 In re Marriage of 
Rossi,71 and In re Marriage of Hokanson.72  Furthermore, the 
Court pointed out that commentators such as the California 
Practice Guide for Family Law have referred to Section 1101 
remedies in the context of nondisclosure of community 
property and not in the context of the nondisclosure of 
separate property.73 
The Court spent the remainder of its opinion refuting an 
argument regarding the spousal fiduciary duty.74  Specifically, 
the Court noted that: (1) on its face, Section 1101(h) 
references Family Code Section 721; and (2) while Section 
1100 exclusively applies to the fiduciary duty concerning 
community property, the Section 721 duty is broad enough to 
encompass the disclosure of separate property assets during 
 
 65. Id. at 593–94. 
 66. Id. at 594. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 
1279 (4th Dist. 2011). 
 70. In re Marriage of Fossum, 192 Cal. App. 4th 336, 347 (2d Dist. 2011). 
 71. In re Marriage of Rossi, 90 Cal. App. 4th 34, 39–41 (2d Dist. 2001). 
 72. In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992 (2d Dist. 1998). 
 73. HOGOBOOM & KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW § 8:612 
(The Rutter Group 2012). 
 74. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013). 
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dissolution proceedings.75  Nevertheless, the Court noted that 
when considering the statute “as a whole,” it did not think 
that the Legislature intended to include the disclosure of 
separate property.76  Principally, the Court stated that “the 
statutory context and nature of the Section 1101(h) remedy” 
supported the conclusion that the remedy is confined to 
community property, and gave several reasons for so 
holding.77  First, it highlighted the fact that Section 1101(h) 
exists in a portion of the Family Code dedicated only to 
community property.78  Second, it referred to—though did not 
name—already existing statutory remedies for a party’s 
failure to disclose separate property.79  Third, the Court 
stated that separate property is not subject to the one-half 
interest formula that is altered by the Section 1101(h) 
remedy.80  Given the above, the Court was “convinced that the 
reference to the general fiduciary duty statute was not 
intended to extend the application of the Section 1101(h) 
remedy to reach separate property.”81 
C. Countering the Court 
The Court’s analysis is unpersuasive for eight reasons.  
One, the concessions it made at the beginning of its analysis 
largely put the issue to bed almost immediately.82  Two, the 
Court’s focus on the location of the statute in the Family Code 
is largely irrelevant.83  Three, the Court does not consider an 
important hypothetical scenario.84  Four, the Court undercuts 
its own conclusion when it discusses Section 1101(f).85  Five, 
the Court mistakenly assumes that other statutory remedies 
thereby preclude the existence of remedies in CFC Section 
1101.86  Six, the Court ignores the reason why 1101(h) exists 
 
 75. Id. (referring to In re Marriage of Walker, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1408, 1419 
(1st Dist. 2006)). 
 76. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 594. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 83. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 84. See infra Part I.D. 
 85. See infra Part I.E. 
 86. See infra Part I.F. 
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in the first place.87  Seven, the Court’s use of case law does 
not help its argument,88 and neither does the secondary 
sources to which it cites.89  Eight, the Court ignores the 
applicability of a case that cites to the issue at hand.90 
1. The Court’s Concessions 
The Court’s legal analysis begins with several 
concessions that ultimately produce a head-scratching 
contradiction.  As previously noted, after it recited California 
Family Code Section 1101(h) verbatim,91 the Court continued 
that when it is interpreting a statute, its goal is to divine the 
legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute92 by giving the words their “ordinary and usual” 
meaning and construing them in the context of the statute as 
a whole.93  One could argue that the analysis should end right 
here.  That is, Family Code Section 1101(h) plainly reads that 
the remedy shall apply to “any asset undisclosed . . . .”94 
Taken with the Court’s stated intent to give statutory 
language the “ordinary and usual” meaning,95 it would appear 
that “any asset” means “any asset” and that Section 1101(h) 
explicitly requires the disclosure of “any asset,” regardless of 
the asset’s characterization as community or separate. 
Furthermore, the Court’s decision to italicize the words 
“as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100” when it recites the 
statute in whole has additional significance.96  Assuming the 
decision to italicize implies that the Court regarded Sections 
721 and 1100 as important for purposes of statutory 
interpretation, it is important to determine what these 
Sections say vis-à-vis Section 1101(h).  As previously noted, 
Section 721 “imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair 
dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair 
advantage of the other.”97  First, one could make the 
 
 87. See infra Part I.G. 
 88. See infra Part I.H. 
 89. See infra Part I.I. 
 90. See infra Part I.J. 
 91. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 92. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Fong, 193 Cal. App. 4th 278, 288 (2d Dist. 
2011)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h) (2014). 
 95. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 96. Id. 
 97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b). 
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argument that a spouse who purposefully fails to disclose 
separate property assets in a divorce proceeding (the 
“offending spouse”) is taking “unfair advantage” of the other 
spouse.  That is, the offending spouse, by their actions, 
hampers the ability of the other spouse (the “offended 
spouse”) to form his or her legal strategy in divorce 
proceedings because the offended spouse is not able to see the 
full picture of the marriage from an asset standpoint.  As a 
result, the offending spouse has a built-in and unfair 
advantage in the divorce proceedings.  Furthermore, not only 
is the offended party disadvantaged by the nondisclosure, but 
the presiding court suffers as well.  A court is likewise unable 
to see the big picture of the marriage and may render a 
judgment based on selectively divulged information that 
contemplates an incomplete picture of the marriage. 
In addition, even if Section 721’s fiduciary duty is 
insufficiently persuasive, the Corporations Code sections that 
it references98 should serve to drive home this notion of unfair 
advantage.  The Court briefly noted that these sections of the 
Corporations Code impose “rights and duties to non-marital 
partners,” but specifically, these duties include: (1) the duty of 
loyalty and (2) the duty of care.99  Regarding the duty of 
loyalty, California Corporations Code Section 16404(b) 
specifically requires that a party “account to the partnership 
for all business dealings.”100  The use of the phrase “all 
business dealings” echoes Family Code Section 1101(h)’s use 
of the phrase “any asset” and supports the notion that 
California Family Code Section 721’s “broad fiduciary” 
relationship creates a large throne before which any and all 
disclosures are required to kneel.  Put another way, if one 
agrees that Section 16404(b) requires complete disclosure of 
all business dealings (regardless of the type of business 
dealing), it would logically follow that Section 1101(h) 
requires complete disclosure of all assets (regardless of the 
type of asset).  Second, regarding care between partners, 
Section 16404(b) requires that a partner “operate under the 
principles of good faith and fair dealing.”101  Here, using the 
plain meaning of the words “good faith and fair dealing” and 
 
 98. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 99. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404 (2014). 
 100. Id. § 16404(b). 
 101. Id. 
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“unfair advantage,” (as the Court requires itself to do), only 
necessitates a small logical leap to arrive at the conclusion 
that a party who purposefully hides assets in dissolution 
proceedings is not operating in good faith.  That is, the unfair 
advantage that the offending spouse gains over the offended 
spouse reflects his or her failure to operate under the 
principles of good faith and fair dealing. 
In the next paragraph of the opinion, the Court’s 
concessions only undermine its ultimate argument that 
separate property disclosures are not required.  As previously 
noted, the Court acknowledged that 1101(h) “facially”102 and 
“simply” refers to the disclosure of any asset and is silent as 
to its scope of application (to community property and 
separate property or to just community property).103  
Furthermore, as previously noted, the Court maintained that 
it found no case law on point as a compass to guide its 
decision.104  Considering these concessions with the Court’s 
discussion regarding the statute’s language, its own emphasis 
of the statutory language, and the rules it must follow 
regarding statutory construction, it appears to be a foregone 
conclusion that the Court would affirm the decision of the 
trial court and hold that Keith should be forced to forfeit all 
that he hid from Tracy in the divorce proceedings.  After all, 
given that Family Code Section 1101(h) unambiguously refers 
to any asset,105 and seeing as this issue is one of first 
impression to a California court,106 the answer has already 
been discovered and the analysis is arguably already 
completed. 
2. The Court’s Legal Arguments 
 As noted above, after the Court made several 
concessions, the Court nevertheless summarily concluded 
that Section 1101(h) applies only to nondisclosures of 
community property.107  Furthermore, the Court transitioned 
to its legal arguments, supporting its conclusion with four 
statutory justifications,108 case law and secondary 
 
 102. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h) (2014 
 106. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 593–94. 
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authority,109 and one final argument regarding California 
Family Code Section 721.110  On their faces, each of these 
arguments seem plausible, and the secondary references are 
on point.  However, upon deeper inspection, each has flaws 
that undermine the Court’s ultimate conclusion. 
D. Not Exclusive & Why Not Have All the Cards on Table 
The Court’s first argument overly fixates on Section 
1101(h)’s general location while ignoring the reason why the 
case is before the court in the first place.  The Court argued 
that Section 1101(h)’s “any asset” means “any community 
asset” in part because Section 1101(h) is located “in a portion 
of the Family Code that exclusively concerns matters 
associated with community property.”111  The reason why the 
parties are in court in the first place is because the statutory 
language of Section 1101(h) is ambiguous to such an extent 
that a judicial interpretation is necessary to determine 
whether or not Section 1101(h) should include separate 
property.  By virtue of this ambiguity, it is questionable 
whether the statute may consider separate property issues as 
well as community property ones.  Therefore, it is debatable 
whether this portion of the Family Code exclusively concerns 
community property, or whether this portion of the code may 
actually address separate property issues as well—even if not 
explicitly stated as such. Put another way, if this code section 
did unambiguously deal exclusively with community property, 
then this opinion likely would have been much shorter, if 
written at all. 
Additionally, the Court fails to consider certain language 
in Family Code Section 1101(a).  California Family Code 
Section 1101(a), a sister statute to Family Code Section 
1101(h), “specifies that a spouse may raise a breach of 
fiduciary claim” when an impairment to the spouse’s interest 
in the community property exists.112  However, in its 
recitation, the Court glosses over the Family Code Section 
1101(a)’s use of the following phrase: “[a] spouse has a claim 
against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary 
 
 109. Id. at 594. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 593. 
 112. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (2014). 
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duty . . . .”113  Returning to the “any asset” discussion above, 
the statute’s direct use of the word “any”114 once again cuts 
toward a more expansive interpretation of the statute as a 
whole (including separate property) than away from such an 
interpretation (excluding separate property).  Of course, on 
the topic of actual language, Section 1101(a) does admittedly 
focus on a breach “that results in impairment to the claimant 
spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the 
community estate . . . .”115  Facially, the Court gets this part 
right—that the breach must incur an impairment to 
community property in order to give rise to the claim.116 
However, what if it is unclear at the time of disclosure 
the extent to which an asset is community property and 
separate property? For example, take Wilma (“W”), who has a 
prospering business that she developed before getting 
married to Harry (“H”).  Unequivocally, this business, until 
the marriage is finalized, is separate property.  However, add 
to the consideration that W operates the business without H’s 
involvement; he is there merely for emotional support with 
regard to the business, but does not participate at all in the 
day-to-day activities. Even without his direct involvement, if 
W continues to operate the business during marriage, the 
business becomes what is known as a commingled asset,117 
with both separate property components (the business that W 
brought into the marriage) and community property 
components (the extent to which both parties contributed to 
the company, if only emotionally, one-half of which represents 
H’s share).118 
Then H and W get divorced, and W does not include this 
business asset, but rather, just her interpretation of the 
community property portions (as the Court’s holding would 
condone).  Should the spouses themselves make this 
judgment call, or should it be up to the Court to look at the 
asset in totality and make the ultimate determination 
pursuant to the accounting doctrines of Van Camp v. Van 
 
 113. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (2014). 
 118. The extent to which the efforts would consist of community property is 
governed by the twin doctrines of Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17 (2d 
Dist. 1921) and Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 (1909). 
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Camp119 and/or Pereira v. Pereira120?  If only for judicial 
efficiency, a court should be given the whole asset at the 
onset, which would stem directly from requiring a party in 
this scenario to disclose the whole nature of the business 
(both separate and community property portions).  In other 
words, it would be more efficient—and a better course of 
action—to have the parties report anything and everything, 
and to require them to put all of their cards on the table at 
the onset, rather than to encourage either of them to try and 
game the system. 
E. Undercutting Its Own Conclusion 
The Court’s second argument ignores the theme of “any” 
and undercuts its own conclusion.  As previously noted, 
California Family Code Section 1101(f) states that “any action 
may be brought under this section without filing an action for 
dissolution of marriage . . . .”121  To the Court, the fact that 
the remedy is available even without a divorce proceeding 
illustrates that it therefore was not intended to extend to 
separate property, which is “generally not subject to the 
control of the nonowner spouse”122 and “typically only becomes 
relevant upon the filing for dissolution.”123  Once again, the 
use of the word “any,” while in this instance not directly 
dealing with the disclosure of separate property, does reflect a 
common theme existent throughout the statute—that of a 
legislative intent to require more disclosures and not less.  As 
such, it again cuts away from the Court’s ultimate conclusion 
that separate property disclosures are not required at divorce.  
In addition, the Court undercuts its argument against 
 
 119. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17 (2d Dist. 1921). “Van Camp 
accounting” grants the working spouse a market rate for their services in 
connection with the operation of the business.  This amount is considered that 
working spouse’s separate property, whereas the rest of the business is 
considered community property.  For more information, see J. Thomas Oldham, 
Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value During Marriage, 1990 
WISC. L. REV. 585, 587 (1990). 
 120. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 (1909).  “Pereira accounting” looks at the 
working spouse’s original separate property investment into the company and 
grants this investment a reasonable rate of return on the initial capital input.  
This amount is considered that contributing spouse’s separate property, 
whereas the rest of the business is considered community property.  For more 
information, see Oldham supra note 119. 
 121. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(f) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 122. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 123. Id. 
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disclosures of separate property at divorce when it states that 
separate property only becomes relevant upon dissolution.  
The thesis of this Comment—which largely argues against 
the Court’s reasoning—is that separate property, in 
particular the disclosure of separate property, is crucially 
important at divorce (if more so than at any other time) and 
therein should be disclosed in its entirety. 
F. Other Remedies Are Not the Only Remedies 
The Court’s third argument rests on an unfounded 
assumption.  The Court stated that the Legislature has 
enacted separate statutory remedies “that are expressly 
applicable to separate property,”124 and cites California 
Family Code Section 271 (for “uncooperative conduct in 
dissolution proceedings”)125 and California Family Code 
Section 2107 (for “nondisclosure of marital or separate 
property in dissolution proceedings”).126  The Court then 
states that the statutes’ placement in separate sections of the 
Family Code “supports that a remedy located in a section of 
the code devoted solely to community property was not 
designed to apply to separate property.”127  By making this 
argument, the Court implies that remedies do not overlap 
between sections.  Further, when interpreting a statute, the 
Court implies the language should be construed with greater 
regard for the context of where the statute is located in the 
code and with less regard for what the code actually says (the 
plain language of the statute and also the code sections a 
statute references).  Looking at the Court’s previous 
arguments, the Court’s implication aligns with their previous 
treatment of the law: up to this point, the Court has both 
overlooked the unambiguous language of the word “any” and 
has glossed over sections of the Corporations Code referenced 
by Family Code Section 721.128  Furthermore, as previously 
noted, there is no indication that CFC Section 1100 et seq. 
are exclusively designed to deal with community property.129  
As such, assuming plain language and full consideration to 
statutory references should be championed in interpreting a 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 129. See infra Part I.F. 
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statute, the Court here has placed misguided emphasis on the 
inconclusive argument of location at the expense of actual 
legal substance. 
G. Why the Statute Exists 
The Court’s fourth argument reflects tunnel vision in its 
interpretation of how much a party might be awarded 
pursuant to the CFC 1101(h) remedy.  As previously 
discussed, the Court noted that each spouse has a one-half 
interest in the community property (CFC Section 2550), 
which the fiduciary duty from CFC Section 1101 is designed 
to preserve.130  The Court then said that, by virtue of the 
remedy in CFC Section 1101, the “aggrieved spouse [is 
awarded] more than his or her one-half interest.”131  This is 
absolutely true: the sanction will result in the offended 
spouse receiving more than they would without the remedy in 
place.  However, the Court then proceeds to maintain this 
“more” does not apply to separate property because this 
separate property is not subject to co-ownership by the 
parties.132  The Court is correct in that, by its very nature, 
only one party owns separate property.133  However, this point 
is secondary to the interpretation of the statute, not primary, 
and therefore should not drive the interpretation of the 
statute.  CFC Section 1101(h) does not exist to return parties 
to their states before marriage by assigning ownership of 
assets (splitting the community in half and returning 
separate property to each party); there are plenty of other 
statutes on point that serve that purpose.134  Rather, the point 
of CFC Section 1101(h)—and the reason why it is unique—is 
to punish malfeasants who disavow the statutory 
requirements of disclosure.  The point of the statute is for a 
court to wield a big stick against those who contravene the 
fiduciary duty to their spouse, not to reward a party for 
duplicity against that same spouse. 
H. Case Law Does Not Help 
As noted above, the Court cited to several “appellate 
 
 130. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013). 
 131. Id. at 593–94. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (2014). 
 134. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g); see e.g., § 1101(h). 
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court decisions [that] refer to Section 1101 remedies in the 
context of nondisclosure of community property.”135  Each of 
these cases indeed covers California Family Code Section 
1101(h), in small or large part.  However, each of these cases 
also, in one way or another and either directly or indirectly, 
support the ultimate conclusion that separate property 
should be a required disclosure at divorce, and not that the 
remedy of CFC Section 1101(h) is limited to community 
property. 
The first case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of 
Prentis-Margulis, does not apply congruently to Simmons.136  
Prentis-Margulis’s principal reference to CFC Section 1101 is 
the following sentence: “[Section 1101] mandates that, for 
purposes of awarding the injured spouse 50[%] of the value of 
an undisclosed or wrongfully transferred asset (or 100[%], in 
the event of oppression, fraud, or malice), the trial court must 
value the assets at the highest of three possible dates . . . .”137  
The Court then determines, pursuant to California Family 
Code Section 1101(g), how to value the asset and notes that 
the statutes “clearly authorize a trial court to . . . best 
[provide] adequate compensation to the injured spouse.”138 
While the discussion regarding valuation might have been 
helpful in that case, it is inapposite to the facts of Simmons 
and therefore does not help the Court justify its ultimate 
conclusion that only community property need be disclosed.  
That being said, there is an argument to be made that the 
Court implied, by its “50[%] of the value”139 recitation, that 
only community property assets should be considered.  
Nevertheless, the Court does not affirmatively hold as such, 
most likely because such a determination was not the 
foremost issue in the case.  If it was the issue that the Court 
was focused upon, the Court certainly could have held that 
the nondisclosure of a separate property asset would warrant 
some or all of the forfeiture of that asset. 
The second case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of 
Fossum, does not focus on the implications of applying CFC 
 
 135. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013) 
 136. In re Marriage of Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1279 (4th Dist. 
2011). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
2015] WHEN “ANY” DOESN’T MEAN “ALL” 461 
Section 1101(h) against an offending spouse.140  Fossum’s 
principal reference to CFC Section 1101 is the following 
sentence: “When . . . the trial court finds a spouse has 
breached her fiduciary duty, but not . . . by conduct rising to 
the level of fraud, malice, or oppression, Section 1101, 
subdivision (g), governs the applicable remedies.”141  The 
Court then recites the language of CFC 1101(g).142  A first 
issue here is similar to that faced by virtue of the reference to 
In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis143: namely, In re Marriage 
of Fossum focuses on CFC Section 1101(g),144 and not CFC 
1101(h)—the focal point of Simmons.  Though the major 
difference between CFC Section 1101(g) and CFC Section 
1101(h) is the requirement of “fraud, malice, or oppression” 
for CFC Section 1101(h),145 the statutes do go hand in hand.  
Nevertheless, a truly malfeasant spouse—one who 
fraudulently conceals their assets—should rightly face 
greater consequences146 than one who does not fraudulently 
conceal.  As such, it makes sense that a court would not 
consider separate property nondisclosures with regard to 
Section 1101(g), because that statute, unlike Section 1101(h) 
is less about punishing the offending spouse and more about 
restitution for the offended spouse.147  That in mind, were 
either this court or Prentis-Margulis faced with the 
circumstances in Simmons—where the point was to punish 
and not make even—they may have considered the usefulness 
of requiring the offending spouse to forfeit their separate 
property to send a message to future would-be malfeasants. 
The third case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of 
Rossi, does not touch heavily upon CFC Section 1101(h).148  
Rossi’s principal reference to CFC 1101 is simply a recitation 
of CFC 1101(h).149  In large part, Rossi focused upon whether 
 
 140. In re Marriage of Fossum, 192 Cal. App. 4th 336, 348 (2d Dist. 2011). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. In re Marriage of Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1279 (4th Dist. 
2011). 
 144. Id. 
 145. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h). 
 146. Consider these consequences in light of the words “but not limited to” in 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h), particularly as they apply to a judge’s discretion in 
meting out punishment upon an offending spouse. 
 147. See supra Part I.G. 
 148. In re Marriage of Rossi, 90 Cal. App. 4th 34, 39–41 (2d Dist. 2001). 
 149. Id. 
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or not the actions of the offending spouse—who hid lottery 
winnings from her husband at divorce—rose to the level of 
fraud as required by the statute.150  Furthermore, the case 
only glossed over the statute, and did not delve deeply into 
the issue considered by the Court in Simmons.151  As such, for 
purposes of demonstrating support for the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion, Rossi is unhelpful. 
The fourth and final case that the Court cites to, In re 
Marraige of Hokanson, similarly only briefly discusses CFC 
Section 1101(h).152  Hokanson’s principal reference to CFC 
Section 1101 largely echoes the language used in Fossum in 
that the court discusses the element of “fraud, malice, or 
oppression” and then moves to a recitation of Section 
1101(g).153  In large part, Hokanson focused upon whether or 
not an offended spouse could be awarded attorney’s fees 
pursuant to CFC Section 1101(g).154  When the court looked at 
the plain meaning of the statute, which includes the words 
“plus attorney’s fees and court costs,”155 it considered the case 
fairly open and shut and rendered a judgment in favor of the 
offended spouse.156  In a similar vein as Rossi, the court in 
Hokanson did not cover much in the line of Section 1101(h),157 
and therefore like Rossi, is unhelpful to the Court in 
Simmons in justifying its ultimate conclusion. 
I. Secondary Authority Does Not Help 
The Court’s secondary authority is unhelpful in that the 
Court fails to show how it assists the Court in making its 
ultimate conclusion.  As noted above, the Court states that 
“commentators refer to the Section 1101 remedies in the 
context of nondisclosure of community property.”158  The Court 
then specifically quotes the California Practice Guide: Family 
Law by Hogoboom & King, including the following in 
brackets: “ [ C]onduct falling below the prescribed fiduciary 
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 152. See In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992–93 (2d Dist. 
1998). 
 153. Id. at 992. 
 154. Id. at 992–93. 
 155. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g) (2004). 
 156. In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992–93 (2d Dist. 
1998). 
 157. Id. at 993. 
 158. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013). 
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standards in the management and control of community 
property subjects the wrongdoing spouse to a statutory 
breach of fiduciary ‘claim’  for which the aggrieved spouse is 
given explicit statutory remedies [Fam. C. § 1101].”159 Many 
of the arguments relating to the fiduciary standards as well 
as the fiduciary “claim” have already been touched upon.160  
However, one significant part of this quote is the “explicit 
statutory remedies.”161  As previously discussed, the statutes 
are facially unambiguous, and explicitly refer to “any asset” in 
consideration of scope within which the statute should apply.  
Because the Court did not emphasize any part of the 
quotation, it is unclear as to which part of this quotation the 
Court wanted its audience to focus upon.  However, if this 
“explicit statutory remedies” segment was an important 
phrase to the Court, then once again, a source that the Court 
relies upon, and in this case even cites word for word, cuts 
against the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the 
nondisclosure of separate property is immaterial for purposes 
of interpreting CFC Section 1101(h). 
J. A Case that Kills 
The Court’s final argument simply ignores the usefulness 
and moreover the pertinence of a case to which it cited.  As 
previously noted, the Court’s final argument countered the 
idea that CFC Section 721 would theoretically be “broad 
enough to encompass the duty to disclose separate property 
assets during dissolution proceedings.”162  In making this 
acknowledgement, the Court cited to In re Marriage of 
Walker.163  Though the Court acknowledged that CFC Section 
721 might push towards that conclusion, it countered by 
reciting its own argument and thus was “convinced that the 
reference to the general fiduciary statute was not intended to 
extend the application of the Section 1101(h) remedy to reach 
separate property.”164  Because the Court took the time to cite 
to Walker, it is worthwhile to examine exactly what Walker 
says on the page to which the Court cites.  Verbatim, the 
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court in Walker holds as follows: “We can fathom no reason to 
distinguish between a spouse’s duty to deal fairly and in good 
faith with separate property and her duty to deal fairly and in 
good faith with community property.”165  This statement 
encapsulates a huge flaw in the Court’s line of reasoning.  By 
trying to bifurcate the duty of good faith, the Court had made 
things needlessly complicated at its own expense.  Rather 
than trying to fashion two separate duties of good faith, the 
Court should have simply stated that good faith requires full 
disclosure, regardless of the type of asset.  That way, no party 
is confused about what they have to disclose, because they 
have to disclose everything. 
K. Notes Regarding Other Authority and Legislative 
History 
It is important to note, as the Court acknowledged in its 
opinion, there are no cases, law review articles, or other 
authorities that discuss Section 1101(h) in the manner in 
which the Court in Simmons analyzes the statute.166  
Excepting those cases already cited which only tangentially 
reference the statute or delve into the statute in a different 
context, Simmons represented the first time a court (and 
authority in general) has decided whether CFC Section 
1101(h)’s express provisions apply to a spouse’s nondisclosure 
of separate property assets. 
Furthermore, a search of the pertinent legislative history 
reveals that the only modification to CFC Section 1101(h) 
came in 2002.167  In that year, the California Legislature 
added the words “as set forth in Section 721 and 1100” to the 
statute.168  If there is an idea to be divined from this change, 
it must be that the Legislature saw the importance of both of 
these statutes in interpreting the language of CFC Section 
1101(h).  And specifically in regards to CFC Section 721, this 
change indicates that the Legislature wanted the fiduciary 
duty to be broadened, and not diminished. 
II. PROPOSAL 
California Family Code Section 1101(h) needs to be 
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clarified via a legislative revision of the statutory language.  
For the myriad reasons listed above, courts across California 
should not be forced to deal with this ambiguity should this 
issue arise once more.  Thankfully, however, though the 
arguments may be complex, the fix that the legislature can 
make is fairly simple. 
After the words “any asset” in California Family Code 
Section 1101, the legislature should include the phrase 
“whether separate property, community property, or an asset 
displaying characteristics of both separate and community 
property.”  By doing this, any and all possible ambiguity is 
negated and everyone is placed on clear notice that the 
statute is going to apply to both community property and 
separate property.  In other words, any party who fails to 
disclose separate property assets at divorce will absolutely 
know that they are running the risk of completely forfeiting 
the asset.  An example of a reformed statute would look like 
the following: 
1101(h).  Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by 
one spouse, as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100, when 
the breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the 
 Civil Code shall include, but not be limited to, an award 
to the other spouse of 100% , or an amount equal to 100%, 
of any asset, whether separate property, community 
property, or an asset displaying characteristics of both 
separate and community property, undisclosed or 
transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty. 
CONCLUSION 
If a change is to be made to CFC Section 1101(h), a 
similar change should also be made CFC Section 1101(g).  
This Comment notes the fact that those who violate 1101(h) 
deserve special treatment for their fraudulent behavior, but 
there are probably (if not certainly) arguments to be made 
that a similar change is unwarranted with regard to the 
sister statute Section 1101(g).  Regardless of whether change 
is necessary for CFC Section 1101(g), change is absolutely 
warranted for CFC Section 1101(h), and the legislature must 
take this issue out of the hands of the courts and make the 
change itself.  This might be wishful thinking given the 
gridlock in Sacramento, but even small, seldom occurring 
issues such as the topic of this Comment should deserve 
recognition when the lawmakers convene to update the 
466 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
statutory language that governs our state.  Hopefully, a 
change is made in the near future to deter malfeasants from 
bad behavior by requiring spouses in a divorce proceeding to 
divulge the existence and nature of all of their assets. 
